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First Impressions 
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the 
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, of issues of first impression 
identified by a federal court of appeals opinion announced between 
September 1, 2006, and January 31, 2007. This collection is organized by 
circuit. 
Each summary presents an issue of first impression, a brief 
analysis, and the court’s conclusion. It is intended to give only the 
briefest synopsis of the first impression issue, not a comprehensive 
analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be exhaustive, but will 
hopefully serve the reader well as a reference starting point. If a circuit 
does not appear on this list, it means that the editors did not identify any 
cases from that circuit for the specified time period that presented an 
issue of First Impression. 
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FIRST CIRCUIT 
 
Maine People’s Alliance v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277 (1st Cir. 
2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the citizen suit provision in the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) § 7002(a)(1)(B), which 
“allows citizens to sue persons or firms whose handling of solid or 
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hazardous waste ‘may present an imminent and substantial endangerment 
to health or the environment,’” should be construed broadly to provide a 
cause of action for claims based on a reasonable prospect of “medical or 
scientific concerns.” Id. at 286. 
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit first acknowledged that “at least four of 
our sister circuits have construed [the relevant] provision expansively,” 
and approvingly noted that the district court’s analysis “follow[ed] the 
interpretive trail blazed by the four above-mentioned courts of appeals.” 
Id. at 288-89. The court cited legislative history of the RCRA, which 
stated that the relevant section was passed “with the avowed intention of 
closing ‘the last remaining loophole in environmental law, that of 
unregulated land disposal of discarded materials and hazardous waste.’” 
Id. at 287. The court analyzed the decisions of its sister circuits and 
found convincing the legislative history arguments that those decisions 
were based upon. Id. The court considered the defendant’s textual 
argument that the plain meaning should control the day but concluded 
that “the interpretive question before us cannot be resolved favorably to 
Mallinckrodt on the basis of plain meaning alone.” Id. at 290. The court 
also disposed of defendant’s separation of powers argument which 
argued that the court was overstepping the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (“EPA”) powers by providing a judicial remedy for merely 
speculative damages. Id. The court reasoned that “this is not a situation 
in which a court has presumed to grant relief that flies in the face of an 
express EPA authorization of certain conduct” because the EPA has 
never “so much as hinted that correction of the Plant’s effects on 
downriver pollution is bad policy.” Id. at 292. 
CONCLUSION: The court found that the probabilistic language of 
the section “leads us to conclude that a reasonable prospect of future 
harm is adequate to engage the gears of RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B) so long 
as the threat is near-term and involves potentially serious harm. The 
language, structure, purpose, and legislative history of the provision will 
not comfortably accommodate the more restricted reading that 
Mallinckrodt espouses.” Id. at 296. 
 
Rucker v. Lee Holding Co., 471 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether and under what circumstances an employee 
who has had a break in service may count previous periods of 
employment with the same employer toward satisfying this 12-month 
requirement” to qualify for protection under the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. Id. at 7-8. 
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ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit first looked to the statutory language of 
the FMLA and determined that “there is no such statutory clarity 
expressing unambiguous intent” to define the meaning of ‘has been 
employed . . . for at least 12 months by the [relevant] employer.’” Id. at 
10. The court considered various canons of statutory interpretation as 
well as the legislative history of the FMLA and determined that 
“‘Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue,’ and  
. . . deference to a reasonable agency interpretation is appropriate.” Id. at 
11. The court found that Congress had “specifically instructed the 
D[epartment] O[f] L[abor] to ‘prescribe such regulations as are necessary 
to carry out [the FMLA].’” Id. Then the court turned to the DOL 
regulations for guidance, noting that “if the DOL regulation at 29 C.F.R. 
§ 825.110(b) clearly resolves this case, and is reasonable, that would be 
the end of the matter.” Id. The court noted that “[w]hen interpreting an 
agency regulation, courts must give substantial deference to the agency’s 
own interpretation of its regulations, so long as that interpretation is 
consistent with the regulation and ‘reflect[s] the agency’s fair and 
considered judgment on the matter in question.’” Id. at 12. The court 
found that “the DOL did not believe its regulation would prevent 
employees from relying on previous periods of employment even after a 
break measured in years.” Id. Furthermore, the court found “the DOL’s 
interpretation of its regulation [to be] reasonable, and that [the] 
regulation, so interpreted, is a reasonable exercise of the DOL’s statutory 
authority.” Id. at 13. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that “consistent with the DOL 
regulation . . . we hold that the complete separation of an employee from 
his or her employer for a period of years, here five years, does not 
prevent the employee from counting earlier periods of employment 
toward satisfying the 12-month requirement.” Id. 
 
Velez v. Janssen Ortho, L.L.C., 467 F.3d 802, 803 (1st Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hat prima facie showing is necessary to establish 
an adverse employment action, within the meaning of Title VII, when a 
plaintiff alleges a retaliatory failure-to-hire.” Id. at 803. 
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis with the language of “Title 
VII, which prohibits an employer from ‘discriminat[ing] against any of 
[its] employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has 
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this 
subchapter, or because he has . . . participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.’” Id. at 806. 
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In surveying the opinions of other circuits regarding the elements of a 
prima facie case for adverse employment action in the retaliatory failure-
to-hire context, the court found those circuit required the plaintiff to 
prove “‘that he applied for an available job; and . . . that he was qualified 
for that position.’” Id. at 807. The court recognized that “[p]recedent in 
the analogous context of failure-to-promote claims also reflects the 
requirement that plaintiffs asserting discriminatory retaliation must show 
that they applied for a specific vacant position for which they were 
qualified, and that they did not get the job.” Id. Finally, the court 
concluded its analysis by noting that the sensibility and fairness of this 
rule. Id. “A failure-to-hire claim obviously depends on the availability of 
a job opening. It is not unfair or unduly burdensome to expect a plaintiff 
to submit an application for that vacancy as a prerequisite for stating a 
failure-to-hire claim.” Id. at 808. 
 CONCLUSION: “[A] plaintiff asserting a Title VII claim of 
retaliatory discrimination based on a failure-to-hire must, in order to 
establish an adverse employment action, make a prima facie showing 
that (1) she applied for a particular position (2) which was vacant and (3) 
for which she was qualified . . . [and] that she was not hired for that 
position.” Id. at 809. 
 
Subsalve USA Corp. v. Watson Mfg., Inc., 462 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a court charged with determining whether an 
order is for a dismissal or a 28 U.S.C.S. § 1631 transfer can also decide 
the substance of the order. Id. at 47. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that all other circuits have decided that 
this type of transfer order cannot be immediately appealed. Id. The court 
explained that, with few exceptions, the final judgment rule applies. Id. 
The court then described the standard for that rule as a decision that 
“ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do 
but execute the judgment.” Id. A transfer order, on the contrary, allows 
the matter to continue in another forum. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review the 
substantive claim that the district court erred in its conclusion that it 
could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Id. 
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McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418 (1st Cir. 
2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether [Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et 
seq.] claims focused on rescission are maintainable in a class-action 
format.” Id. at 423. 
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit started its analysis by describing the 
purpose of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) and the various remedies 
available pursuant to it. Id. at 421. The court noted that “TILA requires 
creditors to disclose, clearly and accurately, all the material terms of 
consumer credit transactions.” Id. Failure to comply with TILA will 
result in liability requiring the lender to pay damages or grant rescission. 
Id. Next, the 1st Circuit looked to the legislative intent behind TILA and 
determined that “Congress did not intend rescission suits to receive class-
action treatment.” Id. at 423. The court analyzed the structure and 
language of TILA and pointed out that class actions were “specifically 
addressed in the section of the TILA relating to damages . . . however, no 
comparable mention of the class-action mechanism [exists] in the section 
that deals with rescission.” Id. The court found this strongly suggestive 
that “Congress did not intend to include a class-action mechanism within 
the compass of section 1635 [which deals with rescission].” Id. 
Additionally, the court recognized the potentially devastating financial 
effect on a creditor faced with rescission as a remedy in a class action: 
“Congress made manifest that although it had designed the TILA to 
protect consumers, it had not intended that lenders would be made to 
face overwhelming liability for relatively minor violations.” Id. at 424. 
Finally, the court found that the “personal nature of the rescission 
remedy gives this legislative history a compelling quality. . . . [T]he 
range of variations that may occur render rescission largely incompatible 
with a sensible deployment of the class action mechanism.” Id. at 424-
25. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit sided with the 5th Circuit on this 
issue and held that “class certification is unavailable as a matter of law 
for TILA rescission claims.” Id. at 427. 
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SECOND CIRCUIT 
 
Islander E. Pipeline Co., L.L.C. v. Conn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 467 
F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the “order of the State of Connecticut 
Department of Environmental Protection (CTDEP) denying Islander East 
Company’s application for a Water Quality Certificate (WQC) for 
discharge into the waters of the Long Island Sound[]” should be 
overturned “pursuant to . . . [the 2005 amendment to section 19(d) of] the 
Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA), 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2000).” Id. at 299. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that section 19(d) of the NGA provided 
natural gas companies such as Islander East Company “with a cause of 
action in federal court to challenge an agency’s order, action, or failure to 
act with respect to permits necessary for the construction or operation of 
natural gas projects.” Id. at 300. The court rejected CTDEP’s claims that 
section 19(d) violated the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments’ guarantees 
of state sovereignty, and ruled that section 19(d) applied retroactively to 
CTDEP’s actions. Id. at 304-09. The court determined that under section 
19(d), a federal court’s review of an action by a state agency should use a 
two tiered standard. Id. at 309-10. The court held that the first step 
should be to ascertain that “the state agency complied with the 
requirements of the relevant federal law.” Id. at 309. The court next 
found that aid that if the first tier is satisfied, the second tier should be to 
review the state action “under the arbitrary and capricious standard.” Id. 
at 310. 
CONCLUSION: The court found that although it complied with 
relevant federal law, CTDEP’s denial of Islander East Company’s 
application was arbitrary and capricious because CTDEP “failed to 
articulate rational connections between the facts in the record and the 
bases for its decision.” Id. at 311. 
 
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom, Inc. v. SEC, 467 
F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether “the ‘fair and reasonable’ standard for 
disgorgement plans  . . . adopted in SEC v. Wang, 944 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 
1991),” should be applied to Fair Fund distribution plans created 
pursuant to “Sarbanes-Oxley’s Fair Fund provision,” and whether the 
circuit court should apply the abuse of discretion standard to the district 
court’s application of the “fair and reasonable” standard. Id. at 82, 84. 
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ANALYSIS: The court “explained that the SEC is charged by statute 
with enforcing the securities laws, and therefore we would defer to its 
‘experience and expertise’ in determining how to distribute the funds.” 
Id. at 82. The court reasoned that a “fair and reasonable” standard was 
appropriate for SEC-administered Fair Fund distribution plans because 
“[w]e have long understood that the SEC’s charge to enforce the 
securities laws carries with it the discretion to determine how to 
distribute recovered profits among injured investors.” Id. at 84. The court 
held that since it had established an abuse of discretion standard of 
appellate review for district court applications of the “fair and 
reasonable” standard in the analogous situation of disgorgement plans, it 
would use an abuse of discretion standard for Fair Plan distributions as 
well. Id. 
CONCLUSION: “[T]he same ‘fair and reasonable’ standard of 
review that applies to the SEC’s distribution of disgorged profits applies 
to its distribution of civil penalties pursuant to the Fair Fund 
provision[,]” and the 2nd Circuit’s “review of the district court’s exercise 
of its equitable powers in approving the plan is for abuse of discretion.” 
Id. at 82, 84. 
 
United States v. Sloley, 464 F.3d 355 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “On what basis can a defendant [convicted of crime] 
challenge a prosecutor’s refusal to file a § 3E1.1(b) motion [under the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.)]” to reduce the 
defendant’s sentence. Id. at 360. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit turned to “case law governing 
[U.S.S.G.] § 5K1.1 that grants analogous discretion to prosecutors in 
filing motions that permit a court to decrease a sentence” for guidance in 
determining when a prosecutor may withhold the motion to decrease a 
sentence under § 3E1.1(b). Id. The court found that “[i]t is subject, . . . to 
the same limits to which a prosecutor’s discretion under § 5K1.1 is 
subject. That is in all cases, a prosecutor cannot refuse to move on the 
basis of an unconstitutional motive, such as a defendant’s race or 
religion.” Id. The court also stated that since the discretion to file the 
motion is “solely in the hands of the government, . . . we may review the 
plea agreement to see if the government has ‘made its determination in 
good faith.” Id. at 361. 
CONCLUSION: The court found that there was no unconstitutional 
motive behind the prosecutor’s decision. “The record shows that 
[defendant’s] reneging on his admission to perjury . . . is what led the 
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government to conclude that he had not accepted responsibility to the 
prosecutor’s satisfaction.” Id. The court also found that “the 
government’s refusal to file was made in good faith. The record shows 
that the prosecutor was honestly dissatisfied with appellant’s acceptance 
of responsibility.” Id. 
 
Moreno-Bravo v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the [REAL ID] Act compels this Court, as 
a matter of jurisdiction, to transfer the case to the circuit where the 
alien’s immigration proceedings were held—here the Fifth Circuit.” Id. 
at 255. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit found that the answer would turn on 
“whether [8 U.S.C.] § 1252(b)(2) is a venue provision or a jurisdictional 
mandate.” Id. at 257. The court explained that “[w]hereas issues of 
jurisdiction relate to the basic authority of a court to hear and decide a 
case, venue, by contrast, is in the nature of a convenience to litigants and 
subject to their disposition.” Id. at 258. Thus, if § 1252 were merely a 
venue provision, transfer is not compelled by the statute. Id. Using 
principles of statutory interpretation, the court found it hard “to believe 
that the legislature would then neglect to express a similarly clear 
intent—or any intent at all—to circumscribe jurisdiction when it came to 
defining the circuit locality of filing such petitions as set forth by § 
1252(b)(2).” Id. at 259. 
CONCLUSION: The court found that “§ 1252(b)(2) is a venue 
provision, not a jurisdictional one. We therefore are not compelled to 
dismiss or transfer the petition, and in the circumstances here presented, 
we decline to do so.” Id. at 262. 
 
DiTolla v. Doral Dental IPA, L.L.C., 469 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether by the enactment of the Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), Congress intended to change the long-standing 
tradition that the party asserting federal jurisdiction bears the burden of 
proving that the case is properly in federal court. Id. at 275. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that, absent an explicit direction by 
Congress to the contrary, “it would be thoroughly unsound for [the c]ourt 
to reject a longstanding rule.” Id. The court explained that Congress 
knew at the time it enacted CAFA where the burden of proof lay and 
from its silence it can be inferred that Congress chose not to alter the 
rule. Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The enactment of CAFA does not alter the rule that 
the party asserting federal jurisdiction bears the burden to prove that the 
case is properly in federal court. Id. 
 
Atsilov v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the circuit court has jurisdiction to review the 
Attorney General’s decision to deny a hardship waiver to an alien who 
has established one of the three grounds for relief under § 1186a(c)(4). 
Id. at 115. 
ANALYSIS: Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), the court noted, 
courts do not have jurisdiction to review any decision or action that is 
under the discretion of the Attorney General granted by subchapter II of 
chapter 12 of Title 8 of the United States Code. Id. Congress, under § 
1252(a)(2)(D), reserved for the courts jurisdiction to review 
constitutional claims or questions of law, including whether the Attorney 
General failed to grant a request if one was required by § 1186a(c)(4). Id. 
The court noted that “the statute provides that if certain conditions are 
established, the Attorney General ‘in [his] discretion’ ‘may’—not 
‘shall’—grant the waiver. . . . [Such language] specifies that an ultimate 
decision whether to grant relief is entrusted to the discretion of the 
Attorney General, thus invoking the jurisdictional bar of § 
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).” Id. at 116. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) deprives 
[the court] of jurisdiction to review the Attorney General’s discretionary 
decision under § 1186a(c)(4) to deny relief to an alien who is eligible for 
relief under the terms of that subsection.” Id. at 116. 
 
Augustin v. Jablonsky, 461 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether a court may employ Rule 23(c)(4)(A) to 
certify a class as to a specific issue where the entire claim does not 
satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.” Id. at 226. 
ANALYSIS: The court held that the plain language and structure of 
the statute support that “[e]ven if the common questions do not 
predominate over the individual questions so that class certification of 
the entire action is warranted, Rule 23 authorizes the district court in 
appropriate cases to isolate the common issues under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) 
and proceed with class treatment of these particular issues.” Id. The court 
further determined that the Advisory Committee Notes support this 
conclusion, “[f]or example, in a fraud or similar case the action may 
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retain its ‘class’ character only through the adjudication of liability to the 
class; the members of the class may thereafter be required to come in 
individually and prove the amounts of their respective claims.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held “that a court may employ 
subsection (c)(4) to certify a class as to liability regardless of whether the 
claim as a whole satisfies Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.” 
Id. at 227. 
 
Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the court has “jurisdiction under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 to stay an order of 
voluntary departure issued by an immigration judge or the Board of 
Immigration Appeals.” Id. at 324. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “in reviewing orders of federal 
agencies, ‘the court of appeals in its discretion may restrain or suspend, 
in whole or in part, the operation of the order pending the final hearing 
and determination of the petition.’” Id. at 329. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that under 28 U.S.C. § 
2349(b), as incorporated by reference in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), the court 
has the authority to stay an agency order pending consideration of a 
petition for review on the merits, and that nothing in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act or its implementing regulations strips the court of this 
authority with respect to orders of voluntary departure. Id. at 332.. 
 
Ofori-Tenkorang v. Am. Int’l Group Inc., 460 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether Congress extended the coverage of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981 beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Id. at 297-
98. 
ANALYSIS: The court began with the legal presumption that 
Congress makes laws for domestic purposes, not extraterritorial ones. Id. 
at 301. The court then reasoned that the plain language of § 1981 
unambiguously conferred these rights only within the borders of the 
United States. Id. The court also looked to the legislative history and 
structure in determining that nothing existed that conferred these rights 
outside of the United States. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit affirmed the holding of the district 
court dismissing plaintiff’s § 1981 claims to the extent that those claims 
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arose from alleged discriminatory conduct that occurred while plaintiff 
was living and working in South Africa. Id. at 227. 
 
Pritchard v. County of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 416 (2d Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the attorney-client privilege protects 
communications that pass between a government lawyer having no 
policymaking authority and a public official, where those 
communications assess the legality of a policy and propose alternative 
policies in that light. Id. at 417. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that “[]when a lawyer has been asked 
to assess compliance with a legal obligation, the lawyer’s 
recommendation of a policy that complies (or better complies) with the 
legal obligation—or that advocates and promotes compliance, or 
oversees implementation of compliance measures—is legal advice.” Id. 
at 422. 
CONCLUSION: Communications between a government lawyer and 
a policy-maker can be privileged, where the lawyer is advising how to 
bring a certain policy into compliance with the law. Id. 
 
Glatzer v. Enron Corp., 475 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether “the docketing of a bankruptcy appeal that 
does not comply with Bankruptcy Rule 8007 (“Rule 8007”) trigger[s] the 
fifteen-day deadline for an appellant to file an opening brief set forth in 
Bankruptcy Rule 8009 (“Rule 8009”).” Id. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit joined the 3rd and 4th Circuits, finding 
that “[t]he notice requirement is an integral part of limitations periods 
found throughout our rules of procedure and the bankruptcy code . . . .” 
Id. The court further stated that “[a]s we will not condone an appellant’s 
dilatory tactics in filing an appeal, we will not hold an appellant 
accountable for a third party’s oversight that was beyond the appellant’s 
knowledge and control.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “the fifteen-day period of Rule 
8009(a)(1) is only triggered once the appeal has been docketed in the 
district court and notice of the docketing of the appeal has been sent to 
all parties.” Id. 
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United States v. Mon-Leang Mui, No. 05-3512-cr, 2007 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 1166 (2d Cir. Jan. 18, 2007) 
Editor’s Note—The Appellant’s “first three arguments present 
issues of first impression in this Court.” Id. at *2. 
QUESTION: Whether “the district court exceeded its jurisdiction in 
submitting certain Sentencing Guidelines enhancements to the jury.” Id. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “[t]here is . . . no jurisdictional bar 
to the use of special verdicts to obtain from a jury advisory findings 
relevant to sentencing.” Id. at *3-4. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “it is undisputed that the district 
court ultimately treated the jury’s Guidelines findings as advisory rather 
than binding, consistent with the remedy decision in Booker.” Id. at *4. 
 
QUESTION: Whether “the inclusion of Sentencing Guidelines 
factors in [defendant’s] indictment, and the submission of that indictment 
and those sentencing factors to the jury, constituted structural error 
violative of his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial.” Id. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “[t]he Guidelines factors 
pleaded in the indictment and submitted to the jury as part of the charged 
offenses are essentially surplusage.” Id. at *5. The court opined that 
“[s]urplus pleadings do not alter the fundamental framework of the trial. 
Certainly, they do not relieve the government of its critical obligation to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the charged offenses.” 
Id. at *5-6. Furthermore, the court stated that “there could be no 
confusion as to the government’s burden of proof with respect to the 
actual elements of the charged offenses because the indictment 
distinguished between those elements and the specified Guidelines 
factors.” Id. at *6. The court continued by noting that “[f]urther, the 
court’s charge instructed the jury to reach the issue of [the] Guidelines 
factors only if it found the traditional elements proved.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “[t]he alleged pleading and 
submission error [could] not be deemed structural because it [did] not 
cast doubt on the reliability of the jury findings with respect to the actual 
elements of the charged offenses or otherwise impugn[e] the integrity of 
the ultimate verdict of guilty.” Id. 
 
QUESTION: Whether the defendant’s “trial counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective.” Id. at *2. 
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ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that the defendant “cannot show 
that counsel’s failure to object to the Guidelines pleadings or charge was 
objectively unreasonable given that . . . the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Booker . . . conclude[d] that the Sixth Amendment required 
[the] Guidelines ‘enhancing facts [to] be alleged in indictments and 
proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. at *11. Furthermore, 
the defendant did not “point to any evidence that would have been 
excluded if counsel had successfully objected to the challenged pleading 
or submission of Guidelines factors to the jury. Id. at *13. The court also 
noted that the defendant could not “demonstrate that an objection by 
counsel to prosecution Guidelines arguments in summation would have 
resulted in a different jury verdict or court sentence.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “counsel’s failure to object to the 
Guidelines pleading or submission was [not] objectively unreasonable” 
and that the defendant “fail[ed] to demonstrate the requisite prejudice.” 
Id. at *12-13. 
 
Tafari v. Hues, 473 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether an interlocutory appeal brought by a pro se 
litigant prior to the entry of a final judgment below is ‘frivolous’ for the 
purposes of revoking in forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), 
the ‘three strikes’ rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).” 
Id. at 441. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “a premature appeal is not 
irremediably defective, and dismissal of such an appeal is not based on a 
determination that it ultimately cannot succeed. Thus, [the court could 
not] consider it ‘frivolous’ within the meaning of § 1915(g).” Id. at 443. 
The court was “further convinced by the structure of the PLRA that § 
1915(g) does not cast so broad a net as the district court held below.” Id. 
The court also found that “designating a dismissal of this ilk as 
‘frivolous’ fundamentally conflicts with the purposes of § 1915(g).” Id. 
Finally, the court noted that “[s]tatements of the PLRA’s sponsors 
further illustrate that it was designed to stem the tide of egregiously 
meritless lawsuits, not those temporarily infected with remediable 
procedural or jurisdictional flaws.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “that the PLRA’s ‘three strikes’ 
provision does not encompass a dismissal for filing a premature notice of 
appeal.” Id. at 444. 
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THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
Fowler-Nash v. Democratic Caucus of the Pa. House of 
Representatives, 469 F.3d 328 (3d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the “alter ego” or functional test should be 
applied “to claims of absolute legislative immunity” when a state 
political caucus is sued after the firing of a legislative assistant. Id. at 
329. 
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that the “‘alter ego’ test lacks 
precedential support from the Supreme Court, from our own Court, [and] 
from other courts of appeals. Its adoption would open a circuit split.” Id. 
Additionally, the court noted that the “‘alter ego’ approach is also a 
poorer reflection of the purposes of legislative immunity than the 
functional approach.” Id. The court also noted that its “own 
jurisprudence regarding municipal personnel actions strongly suggests 
that the Caucus should not be shielded by legislative immunity.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that a functional test applies “to 
claims of absolute legislative immunity.” Id. 
 
Hooven v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 465 F.3d 566 (3d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether “an employee’s severance benefit can be 
grounded in, and enforceable based on, a unilateral contract outside of 
ERISA’s remedial scheme.” Id. at 572-73. 
ANALYSIS: In disagreeing with the district court’s analysis, the 3rd 
Circuit held that “every claim for relief involving an ERISA plan must be 
analyzed within the framework of ERISA.” Id. at 573. “ERISA requires 
‘that any contractually accrued rights be discernible from the written 
terms of the formal ERISA plan documents themselves.’” Id. The court 
recognized that they may “occasionally employ unilateral contract 
concepts in ERISA cases . . . ,” but that “[u]nilateral contract principles 
may not operate to create extra-ERISA causes of action for plan 
benefits.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: In concluding that “[u]nilateral contract principles 
may not operate to create extra-ERISA causes of action for plan 
benefits,” the court observed that this holding “is consistent with the case 
law on this issue.” Id. 
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United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a district court can “sentence below the 
applicable Guidelines range for offenses involving crack cocaine.” Id. at 
247. 
ANALYSIS: “[A] sentencing court could err by applying the 
Guidelines mandatorily (even though the resulting sentence was 
calculated solely upon facts that were admitted by the defendant, found 
by the jury, or based upon a prior conviction), as Booker makes them no 
more than advisory.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: “Post-Booker a sentencing court errs when it 
believes that it has no discretion to consider the crack/powder cocaine 
differential incorporated in the Guidelines—but not demanded by 21 
U.S.C. § 841(b)—as simply advisory at step three of the post-Booker 
sentencing process . . . .” Id. at 249. 
 
Scarborough v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 461 F.3d 406 (3d 
Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a claim secured by an interest in real 
property that includes the debtor’s principal residence as well as other 
income-producing rental property is ‘a claim secured only by a security 
interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence.’” Id. at 
410-11. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “by using the word ‘is’ in the 
phrase ‘real property that is the debtor’s principal residence,’ Congress 
equated the terms ‘real property’ and ‘principal residence.’” Id. at 411. 
The court explained that, “put differently, this use of “is” means that the 
real property that secures the mortgage must be only the debtor’s 
principal residence in order for the anti-modification provision to apply.” 
Id. at 411. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “a claim secured by real property 
that is, even in part, not the debtor’s principal residence does not fall 
under the terms of §1322(b)(2).” Id. 
 
Morgan v. Gay, 466 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) 
provision codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) stating that “a federal 
appellate court ‘may accept an appeal’ from a remand order ‘if 
application is made . . . not less than 7 days after entry of the order,’ 
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should be interpreted . . . to mean ‘not more than 7 days after entry of the 
order.’” Id. at 277. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “in that rare instance where it is 
uncontested that legislative intent is at odds with the literal terms of the 
statute, then a court’s primary role is to effectuate the intent of Congress 
even if a word in the statute instructs otherwise.” Id. at 278. The court 
first turned to the legislative history of § 1453 which stated that the 
“[n]ew subsection 1453(c) provides discretionary appellate review of 
remand orders under this legislation but also imposes time limits . . . 
[and] parties must file a notice of appeal within seven days after entry of 
a remand order.” Id. The court further noted that § 1453(c)(2) “instructs 
an appellate court that it must dispose of the appeal within 60 days.” Id. 
The court then extrapolated the effect of the statute as written, noting that 
§ 1453(c)(1) “would grant [parties] the ability to . . . abuse the litigation 
process because the party who loses on the district court’s remand ruling 
could strategically wait to appeal the remand decision at any time pre-
trial.” Id. Observing the “pre-trial stage of class action cases usually lasts 
many months or even years,” the court opined that so extending parties’ 
ability to appeal under § 1453 “contravenes the uncontested intent of the 
statute.” Id. The court noted that the only other circuits to have 
considered the question, the 9th, 10th, and 11th Circuits, held that 
imposing a “seven-day waiting period followed by a limitless window 
for appeal” ran contrary to Congressional intent. Id. at 279. The 3rd 
Circuit concluded the statute “needs common sense revision that 
accurately reflects the uncontested intent of Congress,” and announced it 
would therefore read § 1453(c)(1) to limit the time for appeal to seven 
court days. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that, “in accord with the intent 
of Congress, “ it would read § 1453(c)(1) of the Class Action Fairness 
Act to require an application to appeal from a remand order be made “not 
more than” 7 days after the entry of the order. Id. 
 
Chao v Cmty. Trust Co., 474 F.3d 75 (3d Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the definition of “person” under § 3401(4) of 
the federal Right to Financial Privacy Act (“RFPA”) applies to trusts. Id. 
at 81. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that a trust differs from corporations, 
L.L.C., and other business structures. Id. at 81. The court further noted 
that “[l]ooking to the equitable beneficiaries of a trust—the real parties in 
interest—rather than to its legal owner is hardly a novel principle in trust 
2007] First Impressions 477 
law.” Id. at 81-82. The court rejected the argument that reading § 3401 to 
include trusts presented a slippery slope; however, the court stated it was 
“not inclined to carve out a ‘trust exception’ to the RFPA’s definition of 
‘person’ solely on the principles the common law of trusts.” Id. The court 
also indicated the argument for considering a trust a “person” under the 
RFPA has no support in case law, and that the 3rd Circuit had previously 
held itself bound by the RFPA’s unambiguous definition of “customer” 
in holding that a corporation is not a “person.” Id. The court further 
noted that the RFPA “requires a customer to hold both legal and 
equitable title,” therefore disqualifying an entity that manages funds for 
trusts beneficiaries without maintaining accounts in those beneficiaries’ 
names. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that a trust is not a “person” 
under the definition in § 3401(4) of the Right to Financial Privacy Act. 
Id. at 82. 
 
FIFTH CIRCUIT 
 
Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether “specific personal jurisdiction [is] a claim-
specific inquiry.” Id. at 274. 
ANALYSIS: The court indicated that the difference that exists 
“between general and specific jurisdiction” clearly indicates that specific 
jurisdiction only arises when a defendant’s forum contacts are related to 
the plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 274-75. Allowing for specific jurisdiction to 
be created, when forum contacts are not sufficient to establish general 
jurisdiction, by forum contacts unrelated to the claim would be a 
violation of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 275. When a plaintiff brings 
multiple claims related “to different forum contacts of the defendant, 
specific jurisdiction must be established for each claim.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: Specific personal jurisdiction must be established by 
forum contacts specific to each claim brought by a plaintiff. Id. at 274. 
 
Darby v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 470 F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a cable service is classified as a utility for 
purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 366, part of the Bankruptcy Code, which would 
provide debtors with protection from having the service cut-off when the 
debtor has filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 574. 
478 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 3:461 
ANALYSIS: The court drew upon the decision of the bankruptcy 
court in In re Moorefield. Id. The court agreed with the bankruptcy court 
“that cable television is not a necessity as it is not necessary to a 
minimum standard of living” and not within the scope of the services that 
Congress sought to protect in passing § 366. Id. at 575. 
CONCLUSION: The Fifth Circuit held that cable services are not a 
utility under § 366. Id. 
 
Lee v. Cytec Indus., Inc., 460 F.3d 673 (5th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether, in order for the statute of limitations to be 
equitably tolled in a hybrid section 301 lawsuit under the Labor 
Management Relations Act, the plaintiff, within six months of 
displacement, must file a grievance with the union. Id. at 676. 
ANALYSIS: The court explained that “because some plaintiffs must 
exhaust internal contractual remedies (e.g. the grievance process) before 
suing, it would be unfair to say that the plaintiffs’ claim is barred by 
limitations if, while the grievance is pending, the six-month federal 
statute of limitations expires.” Id. However, the court instructed that 
plaintiffs must first exhaust internal remedies and “cannot wait until the 
statute of limitations for a federal lawsuit has passed and then file a 
grievance to circumvent the applicable six-month statute.” Id. The court 
further added that “tolling is applicable only for a ‘good faith’ attempt to 
pursue non-judicial remedies” in order to resolve labor disputes. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that in order “to invoke equitable 
tolling [in a hybrid section 301 lawsuit], an employee must file a 
grievance with the union within six months of the adoption of a new 
seniority system” Id. at 676. 
 
Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a school board that opens its meetings with 
prayers under the legislative-prayer exception interpreting the 
Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution nevertheless engages in 
activities that are constitutionally impermissible. Id. at 191. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit surveyed decisions from the United 
States Supreme Court and other circuits in their treatment of deliberative 
bodies that were allowed to conduct legislative prayers. Id. at 195-202. 
Adopting the standard set forth in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 
(1983), the court held that the school board violated the Establishment 
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Clause because it did not fit Marsh’s “narrow exception for nonsectarian 
legislative invocations.” Id. at 199. The court found the opening prayers 
constitutionally impermissible, notwithstanding case law that allowed 
opening prayers by legislative bodies, because the school board at issue 
selected only members of the Christian faith to lead prayers that 
demonstrated “a clear preference for Christianity.” Id. at 204-05. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit affirmed the school board’s 
violation of the Establishment Clause but vacated the permanent 
injunction against all prayer and remanded the case back to the district 
court for entry of an injunction consistent with the narrow quality of its 
holding. Id. at 205. 
 
Stanley v. Foster, 464 F.3d 565 (5th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a reinstatement of a case pursuant to FED. R. 
CIV. PROC. 60(b) has an effect on the running of the statute of 
limitations. Id. at 568. 
ANALYSIS: The court explained that “when a case is reinstated the 
applicable date for calculating the statute of limitations is the date of the 
initial filing.” Id. at 568-69. The court noted that “this is not a new action 
. . . the district court merely reopened the original case.” Id. at 569. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that when a case is reinstated 
pursuant to FED. R. CIV. PROC. 60(b), the running of the statute of 
limitations “should be calculated backward from the time the original 
complaint was filed.” Id. 
 
United States v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether taking an unusual amount of time to pull 
over, coupled with nervous behavior by the driver, amounts to reasonable 
suspicion to justify prolonged detention.” Id. at 404. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “modest delay in stopping time 
does not by itself . . . give rise to reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 405. 
However, “there may be cases . . . in which further context, such as 
erratic driving, acceleration, or passenger movement inside the vehicle 
further suggest criminal behavior.” Id. In this case, the court found that 
the government failed to prove that there was a reasonable suspicion to 
justify prolonged detention because the defendant’s actions did not 
“amount to ‘an articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is 
about to commit a crime’ as opposed to a mere hunch.” Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The court found that absent “evidence of a nexus 
between [the defendant]’s allegedly suspicious behavior and any specific 
criminal activity,” taking an unusual amount of time to pull over, 
coupled with nervous behavior by the driver does not present a 
reasonable suspicion to justify prolonged detention. Id. 
 
United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646 (5th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether, and to what extent [the court should] apply 
the Sixth Amendment standards to a waiver of the Rule 32.1(b) right to 
counsel in the context of a revocation proceeding.” Id. at 650. 
ANALYSIS: The court explained that “Rule 32.1(b) guarantees a 
defendant in a proceeding to revoke parole, probation, or supervised 
release, certain procedural protection—including the right to notice of 
the right to counsel.” Id. at 651. However, the Rule is silent as to the 
“appropriate standard by which to measure a defendant’s waiver of the 
Rule’s protections.” Id. The court noted that the 1st, 2nd, 7th, and 9th 
Circuits have all determined that the waiver of Rule 32.1(b) protections 
must be “knowing and voluntary” as determined by a “totality of the 
circumstances” analysis. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court adopted the “knowing and voluntary” 
approach taken by the 1st, 2nd, 7th, and 9th Circuits and held that “the 
waiver of a defendant’s Rule 32.1(b) rights is knowing and voluntary (1) 
where there is a sufficient colloquy by the district court to assure an 
understanding or freely made waiver; or (2) where the colloquy leaves 
some uncertainty, the totality of the circumstances assures that the 
waiver is knowing and voluntary.” Id. at 652. 
 
SIXTH CIRCUIT 
 
Kellici v. Gonzales, 472 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether an alien’s habeas petition necessarily 
challenges the merits of the underlying administrative order of removal 
for purposes of jurisdiction under the REAL ID Act . . . .” Id. at 419. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “[w]here a habeas case does not 
address the final order, it is not covered by the plain language of the 
Act.” Id. The court recognized that the 1st Circuit addressed this issue in 
Hernandez v. Gonzales, holding that “where a petitioner challenged only 
his continued detention in a habeas petition, rather than his removal, the 
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case could not be transferred to the court of appeals pursuant to Section 
106(c).” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court agreed with the reasoning of the 1st 
Circuit and held that an alien’s habeas petition does not necessarily 
challenge the merits of the administrative order of removal under the 
REAL ID Act. Id. 
 
Kline v. Gulf Ins. Co., 466 F.3d 450 (6th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a federally-prescribed form endorsement 
attached to a trucking company’s insurance contract modifies the 
attachment point of an umbrella policy when the endorsement was not 
legally required in the first place.” Id. at 451. 
ANALYSIS: At the outset, the court noted that the content of the 
curiously, perhaps mistakenly attached federal endorsement form “is 
ambiguous in the context of the umbrella policy to which it was allegedly 
attached, and the form is best interpreted in light of the policies for which 
it was created.” Id. After reviewing the language of the completed 
endorsement form, the court concluded that “[t]he language of [the form] 
as a whole . . . leads to the conclusion that Gulf did not change its 
coverage when filling out the government-prepared form,” but “suggests 
that Gulf intended to offer [the minimum] coverage only if the law 
required such coverage.” Id. at 454-55. Recognizing that this was not the 
only possible interpretation of the completed endorsement form, 
however, the court buttressed its opinion on policy grounds: “Moreover, 
public policy considerations do not warrant additional compensation, as 
[the plaintiff] already received . . . more than the minimum federal 
requirement. The ‘purpose of the [MCS-90] endorsement is to give full 
security for the protection of the public (up to the limits prescribed).’” Id. 
at 455. The court further explained that “[t]he federal government 
balanced the need to compensate victims with the needs of industry and 
determined the appropriate minimum compensation for members of the 
public,” and thus the court should not entertain a reading of the 
endorsement form that would disturb that balance and essentially 
“rewrite the minimum compensation provisions.” Id. at 456. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that the attachment of “the 
[federal endorsement] form did not require that the defendant insurance 
company pay more than what was required under the original umbrella 
insurance contract.” Id. at 451. 
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United States v. Carter, 463 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether sexual offenses committed in 1988 “were too 
remote in time to justify the imposition of a sex-offender-treatment 
condition in 2005” as a supervised-release condition. Id. at 531. 
ANALYSIS: The court looked to the 8th and 9th Circuits to 
formulate a stance of its own. Id. The court noted that where the 
“government presented no evidence that [the defendant] has a propensity 
to commit any future sexual offenses, or that [he] has repeated this 
behavior in any way since his . . . conviction [fifteen years prior]” special 
conditions are not likely “to serve the goals of deterrence or public 
safety, since the [sexually-offensive] behavior on which the special 
conditions are based . . has ceased” Id. The court adopted the view that 
“[s]upervised release conditions predicated upon twenty-year-old 
incidents, [without evidence of any sexual misconduct since then], do not 
promote the goals of public protection and deterrence” Id. at 531-32. 
CONCLUSION: The court refused to dictate “precisely how much 
time must elapse before a sex offense becomes too remote in time to be 
reasonably related to a sex-offender condition” but held that in the 
present case seventeen years was too remote. Id. at 532. 
 
United States v. Allison Engine Co., 471 F.3d 610 (6th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether “a claim must have been paid or approved to 
establish a violation” of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2). Id. 
at 618. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit explained that to the knowledge of the 
court, “no authority exists either supporting the proposition that a claim 
must have been paid or approved to establish a violation of subsection 
(a)(2) or rejecting it.” Id. The court held that the language of the statute 
required that the claim must have already been paid by the government 
before “an individual can be liable under the FCA for presenting a 
fraudulent claim to the government.” Id. at 617. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit concluded that based on the 
language of the statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) requires that a claim must 
have already been paid by the government. Id. at 622. 
 
United States v. Magouirk, 468 F.3d 943 (6th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a defendant who, through a valid plea 
agreement . . . stipulates that the Guidelines will govern his sentence 
2007] First Impressions 483 
despite Booker, but . . . does not explicitly waive his general right to 
appeal his sentence, nonetheless effectuates a waiver of his specific right 
to appeal his sentence on the grounds of a Booker violation.” Id. at 950. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit explained that “[a]t a very basic level, 
the Guidelines afford defendants a degree of predictability that 
the Booker discretionary scheme by definition cannot.” Id. at 951. The 
court noted that a district court, moreover, will not necessarily impose a 
more lenient sentence simply because the Guidelines are no longer 
mandatory.” Id. The court noted that “[a]llowing the waiver of Booker 
rights will give defendants an additional ‘tool,’ providing them with 
another plea option that they will now be able to pursue with the 
government.” Id. Accordingly, the 6th Circuit held that “a defendant may 
voluntarily waive his or her Booker rights, provided that the waiver is 
made ‘knowingly, intelligently, and with sufficient awareness of the 
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.’” Id. at 948. However, 
the court also held that this would effectively waive a defendant’s “right 
to appeal his sentence on the ground that the district court should have 
considered the Guidelines as advisory only.” Id. at 951. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit concluded that a defendant may 
voluntarily waive his or her Booker rights, but in doing so, the defendant 
also waives his or her right to appeal a sentence on the ground that the 
lower court “should have considered the Guidelines as advisory.” Id. at 
951. 
 
Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co. v. Dir., 473 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “Whether the lack of a written recommendation (or any 
recommendation at all) for the disposition of [a disability compensation] 
controversy precludes fee liability under [33 U.S.C. § 928(b)].” Id. at 
265. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “[s]ubsection (b) sets forth the 
requirements for fee liability when an employer voluntarily pays some 
compensation but a dispute arises concerning additional compensation.” 
Id. at 264. The court explained that subsection (b) requires the following 
“in order for an employer to be liable for attorney’s fees: (1) an informal 
conference addressing the disputed additional compensation; (2) a 
subsequent written recommendation suggesting a disposition of the 
controversy; (3) the employer’s rejection of the recommendation; and (4) 
the claimant’s use of an attorney to secure an award of compensation 
greater than the amount the employer was willing to pay.” Id. at 264-65. 
The court found that “[t]he language of subsection (b) plainly states that 
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in order for fees to be assessed under its terms there must be a written 
recommendation containing a suggested disposition of the controversy.” 
Id. at 266. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that under 33 U.S.C. § 928(b), a 
plaintiff “is not entitled to attorney’s fees . . . [if] there was no written 
recommendation regarding the disposition of the controversy.” Id. 
 
Van v. Jones, 475 F.3d 292 (6th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “Whether the [defendant]’s Sixth Amendment rights to 
counsel and a fair trial were violated when the state court consolidated 
his criminal trial with that of his co-defendants at a hearing . . . at which 
[the defendant]’s attorney was not present.” 
Id. at 293. 
ANALYSIS: Noting its jurisdiction to review habeas appeals claims 
de novo, where state courts have not addressed the issue involved, the 
6th Circuit determined that the hearing did not constitute a “critical 
stage” of the trial, since absence of counsel at the procedural step in 
question did not prevent incurable prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 293, 
315. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district 
court and held that “a Michigan consolidation hearing is not a critical 
stage and that the total absence of counsel at such a hearing does not 
require that a writ of habeas corpus issue.” Id. at 293. 
 
United States v. Wells, 473 F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether for purposes of recidivist sentencing under 
the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), a prior adjudication 
of juvenile delinquency is subject to characterization under the 
‘categorical approach’ mandated for the review of prior adult convictions 
by [Supreme Court precedent].” Id. at 642. 
ANALYSIS: The court rejected the government’s stance that the 
defendant’s two prior adjudications of juvenile delinquency were 
“violent felonies,” and consequently refused to consider the defendant as 
an armed career criminal. Id. at 645, 649. The court favored a categorical 
approach instead of a factual approach, because “district courts will 
eliminate the need to examine facts relating to crimes sometimes 
committed in the far distant past.” Id. at 649. 
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CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit adopted the 3rd Circuit categorical 
approach when considering prior juvenile convictions during sentencing 
for new crimes. Id. 
 
United Steelworkers of America v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 474 
F.3d 271 (6th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a dispute over a side agreement that does 
not provide for arbitration falls within the CBA’s arbitration clause.” Id. 
at 278. 
ANALYSIS: The court first recognized the circuit split that exists 
over this issue. Id. The court noted then that the 2nd, 4th, and 8th 
Circuits all utilize a collateral test to determine if a dispute concerning a 
side agreement is arbitrable. Id. The court stated that “[u]nder the 
collateral test, courts consider the similarity of the side agreement’s 
subject matter to the subject matter of the CBA. If the subject matter is 
dissimilar, the side agreement is deemed collateral to the CBA. However, 
where the side agreement is ‘integral’ to the CBA, courts permit 
arbitration of disputes over its provisions.” Id. The court then described 
the “scope” test adopted by the 3rd, 7th, and 9th Circuits, that states 
“unless the parties indicate otherwise, disputes over a side agreement are 
arbitrable if the subject matter of the side agreement is within the scope 
of the CBA’s arbitration clause.” Id. at 278-79. 
CONCLUSION: The court adopted the “scope test as applied by the 
Ninth Circuit.” Id. at 279. 
 
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Conger, 474 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether de novo is “[t]he appropriate standard of 
review to apply to a district court’s judgment on the administrative 
record in an LTCSA [Long-Term Care Security Act, 5 U.S.C.S. §§ 9001-
9009] eligibility dispute.” Id. at 263. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted at the outset that, “[i]n the related arena 
of ERISA benefit disputes, we review de novo a district court’s judgment 
on the administrative record.” Id. Furthermore, “[n]either party offers an 
argument for deviating from the de novo standard, nor do we see any 
reason to do so.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: Therefore, the court concluded, “we adopt the 
ERISA standard and hold that we review de novo a district court’s 
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judgment on the administrative record in an LTCSA eligibility dispute.” 
Id. 
 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
United States v. Davis, 471 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the term “provided” in 18 U.S.C. § 1347 
means that services must be administered personally by the “Health 
Service Provider in Psychology” (“HSPP”) or whether an HSPP may 
delegate duties to any low level unlicensed clinic employee. Id. at 787. 
ANALYSIS: The court first looked at the plain meaning of the statute 
and deemed it to be clear and unambiguous. Id. Further, the court noted 
that to find otherwise would produce an absurd result, allowing 
practitioners to delegate the “lion’s share” of their work to unlicensed, 
unqualified individuals. Id. at 787-88. The court added that Indiana 
obviously knows how to authorize others to perform the services because 
they have done so in other statutes. Id. at 787. The court stressed that in 
all of those instances, the authorized employees were required to hold 
specific qualifications and procure pre-approval from Medicaid. Id. at 
788. Thus, the court found that had 18 U.S.C. § 1387 meant to include 
employees other than the HSPP, it would have specified as much. Id. 
CONCLUSION: “[T]he plain meaning of the words—that ‘Medicaid 
will reimburse for . . . testing when provided by . . . an HSPP’—is that 
the HSPP must be the person who is actually engaged in the conduct of 
performing the tests.” Id. at 787. 
 
Doe v. Smith, 470 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether solicitation of a minor for sex establishes the 
attempt to commit sexual assault or molestation of a child. Id. at 344. 
ANALYSIS: The court first defined attempt as requiring intent and a 
substantial step toward committing the crime. Id. The court then stated 
that most federal courts have construed attempt liberally, using discretion 
on a case by case basis. Id. The court pinpointed how this circuit has 
deemed solicitation of a minor to constitute a sexual act when construing 
the Immigration and Nationality Act. Id. at 343. The court added that it 
has also held in other contexts that solicitation can be a substantial step 
toward committing the crime if strongly corroborative of the requisite 
intent of the crime, or more than mere asking. Id. at 344. The court then 
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addressed the fact that the 3rd and 8th Circuits have held that solicitation 
is not a substantial step for purposes of attempt in sexual assault cases. 
Id. at 344-45. On the contrary, the 6th, 10th and 11th Circuits have 
consistently found the opposite in cybermolester cases. Id. at 345. 
Ultimately, this circuit found persuasive the principle set forth in its 
Immigration and Nationality Act cases that “there is an inherent risk of 
exploitation when an adult solicits sex from a minor who, due to his or 
her under-developed sense of judgment and susceptibility to coercion, 
lacks the capacity to consent.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: When a defendant solicits a child’s involvement in a 
sex act, he takes a substantial step, and therefore, attempts to commit a 
sexual assault on a minor. Id. 
 
United States v. Davis, 471 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether substitute-billing is illegal under Indiana’s 
Medicaid regulations,” or, more specifically, whether a requirement that 
services be “‘provided’ [by the health service provider in psychology 
(HSPP)] must be read to require that the services be ‘personally’ 
provided by the HSPP.” Id. at 786. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that, under Indiana law, “Medicaid will 
reimburse for neuropsychological and psychological testing when 
provided by a physician or an HSPP.” Id. at 787. Applying the well-
settled canon of statutory construction that “words [should be given] 
their plain meaning unless doing so would frustrate the overall purpose 
of the statutory scheme, lead to absurd results, or contravene clearly 
expressed legislative intent,” the court found that the plain language of 
the statute dictates “that the HSPP must be the person who is actually 
engaged in the conduct of performing the tests.” Id. As such, the court 
declined the defendant’s invitation “to read the word ‘provided’ as 
synonymous with ‘furnished.’” Id. Furthermore, the court provided a 
contextual basis for its conclusion, noting that “[t]he Indiana legislature 
has demonstrated that when it chooses to allow so-called ‘mid-level 
practitioners’ to perform some of the tasks that are billed by a 
supervising provider it knows how to make this clear in the law.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the practice of substitute-billing 
is illegal under Indiana’s Medicaid regulations on the basis of the plain 
meaning of the word “provided” and the specificity with which the 
legislature delegated similar authority “[i]n those few instances where 
Indiana is willing to allow mental health services to be administered by 
third-parties under the direct supervision of the HSPP . . . .” Id. at 788. 
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United States v. Haddad, 462 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a defendant charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1957 
(engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified 
unlawful activity) can be shown to have reached the threshold amount of 
$10,000 or more in illegitimate funds when those illegitimate funds were 
commingled with legitimate revenue. Id. at 791. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that it has dealt with the issue of 
commingling of funds in similar cases involving money laundering. Id. at 
791-92. In those cases, the court held that it would be counterintuitive to 
assume that Congress intended for a defendant to escape liability by 
simply commingling his illegitimate funds with his legitimate funds. Id. 
After reviewing other circuits’ approaches to the issue, the court adopted 
the 4th and 5th Circuits’ determination that because it is virtually 
impossible to distinguish tainted from untainted funds, “the government 
is not required to prove that no ‘untainted’ funds were involved, or that 
the funds used in the transaction were exclusively derived from the 
specified unlawful activity.” Id. at 792. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that commingled funds can be 
sufficient to establish the minimum $10,000 requirement for proving 
“engagement in monetary transactions in property derived from specified 
unlawful activity” cases. Id. 
 
United States v. Lock, 466 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[H]ow and whether to count ‘loitering plus’ offenses 
in a defendant’s criminal history score.” Id. at 598. 
ANALYSIS: The court rejected the claim that the offense labeled 
“Loitering-Illegal Drug Activity is not similar to—and is fundamentally 
more serious than—‘simple loitering,’” and reasoned that “similarly 
named offenses are in fact similar.” Id. at 602. The court added that both 
target the same behavior and that the labels do “not change the fact that 
the ordinances primarily prohibit loitering.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that “convictions for Loitering-
Illegal Drug Activity should be excluded from [a defendant’s] criminal 
history score.” Id. 
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EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
 
United States v. Kerr, 472 F.3d 517 (8th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the recommendations of sex offender 
treatment during incarceration made by a district court, as part of 
sentencing, are to be considered “final decisions” under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 for purposes of jurisdiction on appellate review. Id. at 520. 
ANALYSIS: Defendant pleaded guilty to distribution and possession 
of child pornography in violation of federal statute 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2252A(a)(1) and 2252A(a)(5)(B), respectively. Id. at 519. The district 
court sentenced the defendant to 151 months in prison and ten years of 
supervised release. Id. The district court imposed certain special 
conditions on the supervised release as well as recommended sex 
offender treatment while defendant is incarcerated. Id. The defendant 
argued that the recommendations for treatment made by the district court 
to the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) should be vacated. Id. at 520. The 
court noted that the recommendations of the district court to the BOP are 
not binding and the issue of first impression is whether such 
recommendations are “final decisions” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and thus 
whether they are reviewable on appeal. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit joined with the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th 
Circuits and held that “a non-binding recommendation to the BOP is not 
reviewable as it is not a final decision of the district court.” Id. 
 
United States v. Urqhart, 469 F.3d 745 (8th Cir 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the admission at trial of a Certificate of 
Nonexistence of Record (“CNR”) violates a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation in light of Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36 (2004). Id. at 746. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the defendant illegally reentered 
the United States from Canada after a prior deportation. Id. at 747. The 
court acknowledged that during his encounter with law enforcement 
authorities, a Special Agent of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement obtained the defendant’s “alien file.” Id. The court noted 
that after a thorough review of the file itself, and the requisite databases, 
the Acting Chief in the Records Services Branch issued a CNR “stating 
that ‘after a diligent search’ of three databases, ‘no record was found to 
exist indicating that [defendant] obtained consent . . . for re-admission in 
the United States.’” Id. The court found, as a general principle, the 
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admission of a CNR does not violate the constitutional right of 
confrontation because the record is admissible under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 803(1) as an exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 748. Recently, 
however, the Supreme Court found in Crawford that the laws of evidence 
do not define the scope of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment. Id. The court pronounced that “where testimonial evidence 
is at issue . . . the Sixth Amendment demands [a showing of] 
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Id. The 
Supreme Court left unanswered the question of what qualifies as 
“testimonial” evidence. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit joined all other circuits in findings 
that a CNR is “nontestimonial” evidence under Crawford and therefore it 
does not trigger the protections of the Sixth Amendment and is properly 
admissible. Id. at 749. 
 
NINTH CIRCUIT 
 
CreAgri, Inc. v. USANA Health Sciences, Inc., 474 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 
2007) 
QUESTION: Whether trademark priority requires not only use in 
commerce, but also that such use in commerce is lawful. Id. at 630. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit acknowledged that “[i]t has long been 
the policy of the PTO’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board that use in 
commerce only creates trademark rights when the use is lawful.” Id. The 
court noted two prevailing reasons for the lawful use requirement. Id. 
First, “to hold otherwise would be to put the government in the 
‘anomalous position’ of extending the benefits of trademark protection to 
a seller based upon actions the seller took in violation of that 
government’s own laws.” Id. Second, “as a policy matter, to give 
trademark priority to a seller who rushes to market without taking care to 
carefully comply with the relevant regulations would be to reward the 
hasty at the expense of the diligent.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit “agree[d] with the PTO’s policy and 
h[e]ld that only lawful use in commerce can give rise to trademark 
priority.” Id. at 10. 
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United States v. Lee, 472 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a person arrested in American Samoa for 
allegedly committing federal crimes in American Samoa may be tried 
and convicted in the United States District Court for the District of 
Hawaii.” Id. at 639. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit examined 18 U.S.C. § 3238, which 
mandates that “[t]he trial of all offenses . . . committed . . . out of the 
jurisdiction of any particular state or district, shall be in the district in 
which the offender . . . is first brought . . . .” Id. at 641. The court stated 
that if American Samoa was a district for the purposes of § 3238, then 
venue would be proper there, and not in Hawaii, but if American Samoa 
was not a district, venue was proper in Hawaii, because that was the 
district where the defendant was first brought after his arrest in American 
Samoa. Id. at 644. The court found that “[a]lthough the term ‘district’ is 
not defined in § 3238, Title 28 establishes the federal judicial ‘districts’ 
[and] American Samoa is not enumerated as a judicial ‘district’ among 
those listed in Title 28. Id. Thus, it follows that American Samoa is not a 
district pursuant to § 3238.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: “We conclude that [defendant] was properly tried 
and convicted in the Hawaii District Court for committing federal crimes 
in American Samoa because . . . venue was proper in the District of 
Hawaii under § 3238.” Id. at 645. 
 
United States v. Combs, 470 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “By what standard do we review a district court’s 
determination, made during the course of an Ameline remand, that it 
would have imposed the same sentence under an advisory Guidelines 
system.” Id. at 1296. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit observed that “[t]he only guidance 
Ameline gives is that, when the district judge determines that defendant’s 
sentence would not have been materially different [than it would have 
been if imposed after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)], ‘the original sentence will stand, subject 
to appellate review for reasonableness.’” Id. The court announced that 
“there is an issue we can consider that bears on the reasonableness of the 
sentence: Whether the district judge properly understood the full scope of 
his discretion in a post-Booker world.” Id. at 1297. 
CONCLUSION: “The record here discloses that the judge understood 
his post-Booker authority to impose a non-Guidelines sentence and that 
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his ultimate determination was therefore not infected by ignorance or a 
misapprehension of the law.” Id. 
 
United States v. Tuff, 469 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether “an employee [who] exercises a non-qualified 
stock option granted by the employer to purchase shares with money 
borrowed from a third party, pledging the shares as collateral for the 
loan, [has] ‘transferred’ and ‘substantially vested’ [the property] for tax 
purposes at the time the option is exercised, or at the time the shares are 
later liquidated.” Id. at 1251. 
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis with an “overview of the 
statutory and regulatory provisions governing the taxation of stock 
options. . . .” Id. These provisions provide that the receipt of a non-
qualified stock option with no “readily ascertainable fair market value” 
to an employee “generally is not taxable.” Id. However, the provisions 
further provide that this will become a taxable event upon the satisfaction 
of two conditions: “First, the shares must be transferred to the 
employee,” and “[s]econd, they must be substantially vested in the 
employee.” Id. at 1251-52. In addition, these provisions include an 
exception that allows the income to not be “recognized when a ‘transfer’ 
of property occurs by treating the exercise of some stock options as the 
grant of another option, rather than a transfer of shares.” Id. at 1252. The 
court rejected appellant’s argument to apply this exception, and observed 
these arguments to be “nonsense.” Id. at 1253. Because appellant had 
satisfied the two conditions requiring the taxation of a non-qualified 
stock option and because no exceptions were available, the court 
affirmed the lower court’s decision holding that this was a taxable event. 
Id. at 1250. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “a taxable transfer of property 
within the meaning of I.R.C. § 83 occurred each time [appellant] 
exercised his [non-qualified stock] options” and not when the shares are 
later liquidated. Id. at 1255. 
 
ACLU v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the use of portable tables to distribute 
literature is protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 798. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that “use of portable tables is 
analogous to access to newsracks—similarly temporary structures used 
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to disseminate speech-related materials —which is protected by the First 
Amendment.” Id. at 799. 
CONCLUSION: “[T]he erection of tables in a public forum is 
expressive activity protected by our Constitution to the extent that the 
tables facilitate the dissemination of First Amendment speech.” Id. 
 
Quicksilver, Inc. v. Kymsta Corp., 466 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether tacking [an earlier trademark to a subsequent 
one] is an issue of law or fact . . . .” Id. at 759. 
ANALYSIS: In a trademark dispute that applies the tacking doctrine, 
“a mark owner ‘essentially seeks to ‘tack’ his first use date in the earlier 
mark onto the subsequent mark.’” Id. at 758. The 9th Circuit noted that 
only the Federal and 6th Circuits have addressed this issue of tacking, 
“and both consider tacking a legal question for the court.” Id. The other 
circuits arrived at this conclusion by analogizing tacking to the 
“likelihood of confusion” doctrine, which has been treated as a question 
of law. Id. The court noted that “in contrast, [the 9th Circuit has] 
analyzed likelihood of confusion as a question of fact.” Id. Therefore, the 
issue of tacking “should also be analyzed as a question of fact.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: “[B]ecause [the 9th Circuit has] analyzed the 
analogous consideration of likelihood of confusion as a factual question, 
whether tacking applies should also be analyzed as a question of fact.” 
Id. 
 
United States. v. Rowland, 464 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether methamphetamine arriving in Guam on a 
flight originating in Hawaii is ‘imported into Guam’ with the meaning of 
the [Guam Customs officer] statutory scheme.” Id. at 904. 
ANALYSIS: The court was presented with defendant’s argument that 
“drugs ‘imported into Guam’ must arrive in Guam from a foreign 
country,” and that because defendant’s “flight was a nonstop, domestic 
flight . . . the Guam Customs officers lacked statutory authority to stop 
and question him . . . .” Id. “When a word is defined in a statute, ‘courts 
are not at liberty to look beyond the statutory definition.’” Id. at 905. The 
court reasoned that since the statute in question defined the term 
“import,” the statute, then, “prohibits bringing any controlled substance 
into Guam, regardless of whether the substance comes from a foreign 
country or from the United States.” Id. The court continued, “even if we 
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were not convinced by the plain language of the statute, we would reach 
the same conclusion based on the structure of Guam customs law.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that “it is clear that Guam 
Customs officers have the statutory authority to stop and question an 
individual suspected of smuggling drugs into Guam, so long as the 
person is arriving from outside of Guam.” Id. at 907. 
 
United States v. Ressam, 474 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) “criminalize[s] carrying 
an explosive during the commission of another felony, or . . . 
criminalize[s] carrying an explosive during and in relation to that other 
felony.” Id. at 601. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit noted that it “interpreted a similar 
provision in the firearms statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), in United States v. 
Stewart.” Id. at 602. In Stewart, the court determined that the addition of 
the language “during and in relation to” to § 924(c) implied that “a 
relation between the firearm and the underlying felony was required.” Id. 
at 11. The Stewart court further stated that “the evident purpose of the . . 
. statute was to impose more severe sanctions where firearms facilitated, 
or had the potential of facilitating, the commission of a felony. That 
purpose necessarily implies some relation or connection between the 
underlying criminal act and the use or possession of the firearm.” Id. at 
12. 
CONCLUSION: The court applied this interpretation to § 844(h)(2) 
and determined that the omission of the language “in relation to” did not 
preclude a relational element because, like § 924(c), § 844(h)(2) 
contained an implied relational element that the explosive was used in 
the commission of the underlying felony. Id. at 16. 
 
United States v. Hernandez-Castro, 473 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “Whether, following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Booker, the United States Sentencing Guidelines are 
advisory for purposes of calculating criminal history points under § 
3553(f)(1).” Id. at 1005. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit stated that “[§] 3553(f)(1) is not, by 
virtue of its reference to the Sentencing Guidelines, rendered advisory by 
Booker.” Id. at 1006. The 9th Circuit explained that the Supreme Court 
decided in Booker that mandatory sentencing guidelines were 
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unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment, but held that “the 
remainder of the [Sentencing Guidelines] Act satisfies the Court’s 
constitutional requirements” and therefore remained intact. Id. at 1007. 
Applying these principles, the court determined that “[§] 3553(f)(1) falls 
squarely within the ‘remainder of the Act’ that is unaffected by Booker” 
because “[i]n calculating criminal history points . . . the district court is 
simply ascertaining prior convictions, a determination that passes 
constitutional scrutiny.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: “[W]e join our sister circuits in holding that Booker 
left in tact the requirement of § 3553(f)(1) that a defendant ‘not have 
more than 1 criminal history point.’” Id. at 1005. 
 
United States v. Hicks, 472 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: First, “whether § 3582(c)(2) proceedings fall within the 
scope of Booker. Second, if they fall within Booker’s ambit, . . . whether 
policy statements by the Sentencing Commission nonetheless preclude 
the application of Booker to § 3582(c)(2). Id. at 1169. 
ANALYSIS: The court explained that, after Booker, the sentencing 
system is no longer mandatory and therefore “district courts are 
necessarily endowed with the discretion to depart from the Guidelines 
when issuing new sentences under § 3582(c)(2).” Id. at 1170. Thus, the 
court stated that while § 3582(c)(2) proceedings fall within the scope of 
Booker, resentencing is not because of Booker, but instead the 
resentencing entitlement is based on § 3582(c)(2). Id. at 1171. The court 
acknowledged that the Guidelines may be unfavorable to a discretionary 
scheme, but declared that the Guidelines should be viewed in an advisory 
fashion. Id. at 1172.  The court announced that “under Booker, to the 
extent that the policy statements would have the effect of making the 
Guidelines mandatory (even in the restricted context of § 3582(c)(2)), 
they must be void.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “[b]ecause Booker abolished the 
mandatory application of the Sentencing Guidelines in all contexts, and 
because reliance on its holding is not inconsistent with any applicable 
policy statement, . . . [the court held] that Booker applies to § 3582(c)(2) 
proceedings” and that the policy statements do not preclude application 
of Booker to § 3582(c)(2). Id. at 1169. 
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United States v. Fort, 472 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether “local police reports . . . qualify for the Rule 
16(a)(2) exemption and [if so, whether] they are, therefore, discoverable 
materials under FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E).” Id. at 1110. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by reviewing the text of Rule 16 and 
found that “written police reports . . . are ‘documents’ within the 
‘possession, custody, or control’ of the federal prosecutor and that they 
are ‘material to preparing the defense.’” Id. The court, therefore, held 
that “the reports are discoverable under Rule 16(a)(1)(E) unless 
exempted by Rule 16(a)(2).” Id. The court next found it necessary to 
ascertain “what is meant by ‘government agent’ and ‘the case,’” and 
determined that the Advisory Committee notes suggested that 
“‘government agent’ includes non-federal personnel whose work 
contributes to a federal criminal ‘case.’” Id. at 1110-13. Emphasizing a 
support for a symmetrical reading of the discovery obligations of Rule 
16, the court stated that since the “federal prosecution is a direct 
outgrowth of investigations by local authorities,” covering the same 
conduct that the defendants were charged with in the federal indictment, 
“[f]or all practical purposes, including the application of Rule 16(a)(2), 
this local investigation and federal prosecution should be considered one 
‘case.’” Id. at 1114, 1119. The court explained that holding otherwise, 
“thereby making underlying local or state investigatory files subject to 
pre-trial discovery by a subsequently federally indicted defendant, would 
in all likelihood inhibit cooperation between local and federal law 
enforcement agencies, to the benefit of criminals but to the detriment of 
the public good.” Id. at 1119. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “Rule 16(a)(2) extends to . . . 
[local] police reports created prior to federal involvement but 
relinquished to federal prosecutors to support a unified prosecution of 
Defendants for the same criminal activity that was the subject of the local 
investigation.” Id. at 1119-20. The court explained that “[t]hese types of 
documents have always been protected under federal law if compiled by 
federal officers” and therefore the court declared that there was no reason 
“why the law should be any different in a federal prosecution regardless 
of who gathered the statements.” Id. at 1120. 
 
Zi-Xing Lin v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether “8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) precludes an alien 
who has been removed from the United States from filing a motion to 
reopen those removal proceedings.” Id. at 981. 
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ANALYSIS: The court examined the regulation and noted that it is 
“phrased in the present tense and so by its terms applies only to a person 
who departs the United States while he or she ‘is the subject of removal   
. . . proceedings.’” Id. at 982. The court explained that “[b]ecause 
petitioner’s original removal proceedings were completed when he was 
removed to China, he did not remain the subject of removal proceedings 
after that time.” Id. Thus, the court determined that “[w]hile the 
regulation may have been intended to preclude aliens in petitioner’s 
situation from filing motions to reopen their completed removal 
proceedings, the language of the regulation does not unambiguously 
support this result.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court construed the ambiguity in favor of the 
petitioner and against the government, holding that 8 C.F.R. §  
1003.23(b)(1) does not preclude an alien who has been removed from the 
United States from filing a motion to reopen those removal proceedings. 
Id. 
 
Af-Cap Inc. v. Chevron Overseas (Congo) Ltd., 475 F.3d 1080 (9th 
Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether, under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1610, the court can 
determine if the “property was used for a commercial activity in the 
United States by examining the entire underlying activity that generated 
the property in question.” Id. at 1087. 
ANALYSIS: The property of a foreign state is immune to attachment 
by courts in the United States, unless they are “used for a commercial 
activity in the United States”. Id. The court chose to read the statute 
narrowly, agreeing with the 5th Circuit’s ruling that “Subsection (a) 
regarding property belonging directly to a foreign state, permits 
execution only narrowly, when the property is ‘in the United States’ and 
‘used for a commercial purpose in the United States.’” Id. at 1088. 
CONCLUSION: The court ruled “that property is ‘used for a 
commercial activity in the United States’ when the property in question 
is put into action, put into service, availed or employed for a commercial 
activity, not in connection with a commercial activity or in relation to a 
commercial activity.” Id. at 1091. 
 
J&G Sales, Ltd. v. Truscott, 473 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, 
and Explosives has the statutory authority to send demand letters to 
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federal firearms licensees requiring them to provide specified record 
information. Id. at 1047. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that the plain language of the statute 
clearly authorizes the Bureau to issue demand letters. Id. at 1048. 
Further, the court noted, the other parts of the statute did not generally 
limit the Bureau’s right to issue demand letters, but instead restricted 
letters and investigations under certain circumstances. Id. at 1049-51. 
CONCLUSION: The court found the statute to be clear and, with 
guidance from the 4th Circuit, accepted the plain reading of the statute 
that the Bureau has the authority to send demand letters to Federal 
firearms licensees. Id. at 1047-48. 
 
United States v. Combs, 470 F.3d 1294 (9th Circuit 2006) 
QUESTION: “By what standard do we review a district court’s 
determination, made during the course of an Ameline remand, that it 
would have imposed the same sentence under an advisory Guidelines 
system.” Id. at 1296. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit examined Ameline and found that the 
court would review for reasonableness, a district judge’s determination, 
that a sentence under the advisory Guidelines would not be materially 
different. Id. However, because the sentencing was done under a limited 
Ameline remand, the court stated that the reasonableness review was very 
different than one conducted on post-Booker sentences. Id. The court 
noted that such a review only takes place if the district judge determines 
on his review that “the sentence would have been materially different 
under an advisory Guidelines system.” Id. at 1296-97. The court stated 
that its reasonableness review is thus based on “[w]hether the district 
judge properly understood the full scope of his discretion in a post-
Booker world.” Id. at 1297. 
CONCLUSION: The court found that the record indicated that the 
district judge did understand his authority under the post-Booker regime 
and therefore his decision to allow the original sentence to stand was 
reasonable under Ameline. Id. 
 
Snow-Erlin v. United States, 470 F.3d 804 (9th Cir. 2006). 
QUESTION: “Whether a claim for negligent miscalculation of a 
release date arises out of false imprisonment for purposes of the [Federal 
Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)].” Id. at 808. 
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ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit indicated that the sovereign immunity 
of the United States is waived under the FTCA for certain torts, but that 
claims “arising” from false imprisonment are exempt under the statute. 
Id. While the plaintiff in this case brought a claim of negligence, the 
court stated that “[t]his circuit looks beyond the labels used to determine 
whether a proposed claim is barred [under § 2680(h)].” Id. The plaintiff’s 
only claim was that the United States held her deceased husband for 
longer than his sentence. Id. at 808-09. The court stated that the 
“exclusion of false imprisonment claims” cannot be avoided by raising 
another claim connected to that false imprisonment. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that a claim for negligent 
miscalculation of a release date arising out of false imprisonment is 
excluded under the FTCA, and thus barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). 
Id. 
 
TENTH CIRCUIT 
 
Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether an unincorporated association is a ‘person’ 
for the purposes of Section 1983.” Id. at 1213. 
ANALYSIS: The court considered “(1) the legislative history of 
Section 1983, (2) the general understanding, as of 1871, regarding the 
legal personality of unincorporated associations, and (3) the Dictionary 
Act of 1871.” Id. The court found “no indication within the legislative 
history of Section 1983 that Congress considered the term ‘persons’ to 
include unincorporated associations,” and noted that “there was no 
general understanding in 1871, when the precursor to Section 1983 was 
passed, that unincorporated associations should be treated as natural 
persons.” Id. Lastly, the court proffered that “while the Dictionary Act of 
1871 extended the meaning of ‘person’ to include corporations and 
municipalities, it did not do the same for unincorporated associations.” 
Id. at 1214. 
CONCLUSION: The court held an unincorporated association is not 
a “person” entitled to bring a claim under § 1983. Id. at 1216. 
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United States v. Pettigrew, 468 F.3d 626 (10th Cir. 2006) 
Editor’s Note:  This 10th Circuit opinion substituted the original 
opinion in Unite States v. Pettigrew, 455 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2006), 
which was summarized in Issue Number 1 of this Volume. 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a pre-warning confession, not itself a 
violation of Miranda, but obtained subsequent to two violations of 
Miranda, must be suppressed.” Id. at 634. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the “unwarned confession taken in 
violation of Miranda must be suppressed, but it does not necessarily 
follow that every subsequent voluntary statement made by a suspect must 
be suppressed as well.” Id. at 635. Additionally, the court stated that 
“Miranda itself recognized that any statement given freely and 
voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in 
evidence.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court joined “the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in 
holding that the admissibility of an unsolicited inculpatory statement, 
following a voluntary statement made in violation of Miranda, turns on 
whether the inculpatory statement was knowingly and voluntarily made. 
In the absence of coercion or improper tactics, a broader rule would 
undercut the twin rationales of Miranda’s exclusionary rule—
trustworthiness and deterrence.” Id. at 636. 
 
Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418 (10th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a court should apply the law of the forum or 
the law of the jurisdiction chosen by the parties to interpret a forum-
selection clause in an international commercial agreement. Id. at 427. 
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit examined the issue of what law should 
apply when interpreting a forum-selection clause in an international 
agreement that contains a choice-of-law clause. Id. at 427. The court 
observed, however, that “when a court interprets a contract, as a general 
matter it applies the law that the parties selected in their contract” in 
accordance with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS. 
Id. The court noted that “two ‘prime objectives’ of contract law are ‘to 
protect the justified expectations of the parties and to make it possible for 
them to foretell with accuracy what will be their rights and liabilities 
under the contract.’” Id. at 428. The court observed that “[w]e see no 
particular reason, at least in the international context, why a forum-
selection clause . . . should be singled out as a provision not to be 
interpreted in accordance with the law chosen by the contracting parties.” 
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Id. The court noted that “Supreme Court opinions in international 
disputes emphasize the primacy of the parties’ agreement regarding the 
proper forum” and that “[t]he words [of a forum-selection provision] 
may take on different meanings depending on the law used to interpret 
them.” Id. The court noted further that “when the contract contains a 
choice-of-law clause, a court can effectuate the parties’ agreement . . . 
only if it interprets the forum clause under the chosen law.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that “when an international 
commercial agreement has both choice-of-law and forum-selection 
provisions, the forum-selection provision must ordinarily be interpreted 
under the law chosen by the parties.” Id. at 421. 
 
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
United States v. Milkintas, 470 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the government, having been provided 
notice that a defendant is willing to provide information about a crime, is 
under any obligation to solicit that information from a defendant.” Id. at 
1345. 
ANALYSIS: Section 2D1.1(b)(7) of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines provide for a two-level reduction in a defendant’s offense 
level for certain delineated offenses, if certain safety-valve criteria are 
met under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5). Id. at 1344. At issue in this case is 
the fifth criterion: the defendant must “truthfully provide[] to the 
Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning 
the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of 
a common scheme or plan.” Id. at 1345. The 11th Circuit has held that a 
defendant seeking to take advantage of this provision bears the burden of 
proving eligibility for safety-valve relief.” Id. The court noted that “[a]ll 
circuits . . . have held [that] the government is under no obligation to 
solicit information from defendants who seek to satisfy [the statutory] 
requirement to provide information.” Id. at 1345. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that a mere willingness to 
provide information is insufficient to meet the criterion. Id. Further, the 
court ruled that “[a]cting in good faith is a necessary condition for 
satisfying the safety-valve criteria, not a sufficient one” and the 
defendant is required to “come forward and truthfully supply all the 
information that he possesses about his involvement in the offense.” Id. 
at 1346. 
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Stephens v. Tolbert, 471 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a district court abuses its discretion when it 
accepts an argument that had not been presented to the magistrate judge.” 
Id. at 1176. 
ANALYSIS: In analyzing whether a district court can accept an 
argument not considered by a magistrate judge, the court emphasized the 
magistrate judge’s subordinate position when rendering dispositive 
motions: “[w]hen a district court refers a dispositive motion to a 
magistrate judge for a report and recommendation, the district court 
retains, as a statutory and a constitutional matter, broad discretion over 
the report and recommendation.” Id. The court further highlighted that 
“under the Federal Magistrates Act, ‘the magistrate [judge] has no 
authority to make a final and binding’ ruling on a dispositive motion,” 
and that “[e]ven if no objections to the findings or recommendations 
have been filed, the district court may undertake ‘further review . . . , sua 
sponte or at the request of a party, under a de novo or any other 
standard.’” Id. As such, the court ruled that “[i]n the light of [such] broad 
discretion, [a] district court [i]s not barred from considering an argument 
. . . that had not been presented to the magistrate judge.” Id. Finally, the 
court rejected the argument that “the district court performed an appellate 
function . . . [by] considering an argument not raised before the 
magistrate judge,” pointing out that “the relationship between district 
courts and magistrate judges differs significantly from the relationship 
between appellate courts and district courts.” Id. The court opined that a 
“‘magistrate judge has no authority to make a final and binding’ ruling 
on a dispositive motion, and a district court ‘may . . . receive further 
evidence’ when it reviews the report and recommendation of a magistrate 
judge.” Id. at 1176-77. The court recognized that this holding was at 
odds with those of the 1st and 9th Circuits. Id. 
CONCLUSION: A “district court [does] not abuse its discretion by 
accepting [an]  . . . argument” that was not brought before the magistrate 
judge. Id. at 1176. 
 
Gulfcoast Med. Supply v. Sec’y, Dep’t. of Health and Human Servs., 
468 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the Secretary of the Department of Health and 
Human Services may require a durable medical equipment supplier to 
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submit additional evidence that its equipment is medically necessary 
under Part B of the Medicare Act. Id. at 1348. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the auditing provisions of Part B 
within the Medicare Act indicated that “Congress unambiguously 
contemplated the Secretary’s authority to require suppliers to submit 
medical documentation beyond a CMN [Certificate of Medical 
Necessity] to prove medical reasonableness and necessity.” Id. at 1352. 
Furthermore, the court reasoned that not permitting additional evidence 
of medical necessity would deny the Secretary the power to refuse claims 
with certificates signed by dishonest or incompetent physicians. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district 
court and held that “when the Medicare Act is read as a whole, it 
unambiguously permits carriers and the Secretary to require suppliers to 
submit evidence of medical necessity beyond a CMN.” Id. 
 
Mingkid v. Att’y Gen., 468 F.3d 763 (11th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTIONS: “[W]hether the [Immigration Judge] may make a 
frivolity finding notwithstanding a determination that the asylum 
application is time-barred” and whether the circuit court had independent 
jurisdiction to review a [Board of Immigration Appeal]’s frivolity 
determination when the petitioner concede[d] both removability and a 
failure to establish eligibility for asylum.” Id. at 766. 
ANALYSIS: The court cited Section 240 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act and specific agency regulations to conclude that the 
backdrop of statutes and regulations did not contain any prohibition to 
bar an Immigration Judge’s authority to make a determination that the 
untimely application for asylum at issue was frivolous. Id. at 768. The 
11th Circuit acknowledged Article III of the U.S. Constitution as the 
source of the court’s power to determine if it had jurisdiction over the 
frivolity determination, and reasoned that it had jurisdiction since its 
opinion would not be advisory and could afford the petitioners 
immediate relief. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit declared that the Immigration 
Judge had jurisdiction to make a frivolity finding and the circuit court 
had jurisdiction to review such a determination. Id. at 766. 
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United States v. Linh Pham, 463 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 1B1.8 
prohibits the government’s use of “statements and information obtained 
pursuant to [the defendant’s] plea and cooperation or from sources 
provided by [the defendant] and previously unknown to the government” 
in determining the defendant’s sentence. Id. at 1243. 
ANALYSIS: The court looked to other circuits for guidance on this 
question and noted that the 3rd Circuit has held that “the use of 
information post-dating the agreement and obtained from independent 
sources is not barred.” Id. Also, “[i]nformation separately gleaned from 
co-defendants is also fair game.” Id. However, “the government may not 
evade U.S.S.G. § 1B1.8(a) where the evidence was elicited solely as a 
result of, or prompted by, the defendant’s cooperation.” Id. at 1243-44. 
CONCLUSION: The court “conclude[d] that, so long as the 
information is obtained from independent sources or separately gleaned 
from codefendants, it may be used at sentencing without violating 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.8.” Id. at 1244. 
 
Tmesys, Inc. v. Eufaula Drugs, Inc., 462 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether [the court] ha[s] jurisdiction to review an 
order remanding a case based on a finding that CAFA does not apply and 
what law controls as to when an action has ‘commenced’ for purposes of 
CAFA.” Id. at 1319. 
ANALYSIS: The court did not conduct any analysis in the opinion, 
but stated that it had “already received briefing from all parties on the 
jurisdictional issue and is ruling only on that threshold issue.” Id. at 1319 
n.1. 
CONCLUSION: The court found that it had “jurisdiction to review a 
district court’s order to remand when that order is based on a 
determination that CAFA does not apply, at least to the extent of 
reexamining that jurisdictional issue.” Id. at 1319. The court noted that 
“as to the second issue, the consensus among circuits is that state law 
determines when an action is commenced for purposes of CAFA.” Id. 
 
United States v. Williams, 469 F.3d 963 (11th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether, “in order to commit a violation of [21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(1)(A)] . . . after two or more prior convictions for a felony drug 
offense have become final, [defendant] must have been involved in 
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transactions totaling five kilograms or more of cocaine after his second 
prior conviction became final.” Id. at 966. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) states, in 
relevant part, that “[i]f any person commits a violation of this 
subparagraph . . . after two or more prior convictions for a felony drug 
offense have become final, such person shall be sentenced to a 
mandatory term of life imprisonment without release.” Id. The court 
agreed with the 6th Circuit’s reasoning in a similar case in which the 
defendant was “charged with a single, ongoing conspiracy [which h]e 
committed . . . every day over the life of the agreement, and the timing of 
each separate overt act is not controlling.” Id. The 6th Circuit concluded 
that “the violation involved more than 50 grams of cocaine base. 
Therefore, the district court properly applied the statutory sentence 
mandated by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).” Id. at 966-67. The 11th Circuit 
then turned to “[t]he nature of a conspiracy” to support is holding. Id. at 
967. The court noted that “[t]he gist of the crime of conspiracy . . . is the 
agreement or confederation of the conspirators to commit one or more 
unlawful acts,” not “the commission of the crime which it contemplates.” 
Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument 
and held that the defendant’s “continued participation in a single 
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five 
kilograms or more of cocaine after his second prior conviction became 
final triggered the mandatory minimum term of life imprisonment under 
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii).” Id. 
 
Odili v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 474 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: What is the proper standard of review of a parole 
board’s role assessment determination in a transfer treaty hearing. Id. at 
1260. 
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit noted that the court has “long and 
repeatedly held that a district court’s determination of a defendant’s role 
in the offense is a finding of fact to be reviewed only for clear error.” Id. 
at 1260. The court held that a parole board’s determination of role 
assessment in a transfer treaty hearing should similarly be reviewed for 
clear error. Id. The court recognized that the 5th, 7th, and 9th Circuits 
had reached similar conclusions. Id. 
CONCLUSION: “Given that a transfer treaty hearing is the 
functional equivalent of a sentencing hearing, the ‘clear error’ standard 
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for review of a district court’s role assessment determination applies with 
equal force to the review of such a determination made by the Parole 
Commission in [this] context.” Id. 
